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1Abstract
This study examines the nature of the interaction of banks and community development financial 
institutions (CDFIs) in small business lending. We examine the experience of six different CDFIs that vary 
by size, corporate structure, and market. We explore how they both collaborate and compete with regulated 
lenders, and how changes in local and national market dynamics affect their activities. Our case studies 
are not necessarily representative of the CDFI industry, but they offer insights on the factors that shape 
CDFIs’ interactions with and responses to more mainstream institutions. Our findings are therefore more 
descriptive than prescriptive, although we offer suggestions for both CDFI practice and future research.
A key finding from the case studies of the existence of a continuum of credit within which banks and 
CDFIs (typically nondepository loan funds) develop referral relationships that allow each to serve 
small businesses of varying credit-worthiness. Such collaborations can be mutually beneficial, but also 
problematic for CDFIs when mergers and acquisitions reduce the number of financial institutions active 
in the local market and disrupt relationships. Problems can also arise for CDFIs if banks require CDFIs to 
improve a bank’s bottom line as a condition of CDFI funding. A CDFI’s source of lending capital is also 
critical in determining the nature of the bank/CDFI relationship. In addition to competition for loans 
from aggressive, niche-oriented start-up banks, depository CDFIs compete with larger banks for consumer 
and small business deposits, their key source of lending capital. The study also considers the current credit 
tightening and economic downturn. It examines both the opportunities for CDFI as banks restrict their 
small business lending, and the potential impact the economic downturn on CDFI underwriting policies. 
Substantial research has documented that minority-owned firms, firms in lower-income and predominantly 
minority communities, and firms in rural areas have difficulty accessing capital for small business 
development.1 In particular, start-up firms and businesses owned by individuals with low levels of equity, 
limited collateral, damaged credit, or inexperience developing business plans often struggle to obtain 
affordable loans from mainstream financial institutions. The companies typically cannot satisfy the 
underwriting criteria of these lenders, and relatively few have the high-growth potential that would attract 
traditional venture capitalists. As a result, the owners frequently must rely on credit card financing and 
capital infusions from the families and friends, sources that tend to limit the companies’ prospects for 
growth.
In many lower-income markets, community development financial institutions (CDFIs) are among the 
leading providers of credit and investment capital to small and emerging businesses. Although the volume 
of their lending still pales in comparison to that of regulated financial institutions, their borrowers often 
differ from those served by more mainstream lenders. CDFIs frequently serve companies that require 
relatively small loans ($100,000 or less) and considerable assistance in refining business plans, analyzing 
market opportunities, and implementing financial management procedures. In many cases, the CDFIs have 
worked in partnership with conventional lenders to serve these companies. Mainstream banks and thrifts 
have often provided the CDFIs with both operating and loan capital to enable the CDFIs to make smaller 
business loans. Mainstream institutions also frequently have provided debt in partnership with CDFIs to 
meet the credit needs of larger and more stable companies. 
The relationship between CDFI small business lenders and conventional banks and thrifts depends on 
many factors. Local market characteristics certainly affect the interactions, as do the institutional structures 
of the CDFI and the underlying incentive(s) of the mainstream lenders. The state of the economy and the 
changes affecting the broader financial marketplace also play key roles. For example, pressures to generate 
greater returns have made banks much less willing to provide CDFIs with equity-equivalent loans or patient 
and low-cost capital that had helped CDFIs expand their portfolios considerably.
Relatively few studies have looked critically at the roles of and relationships among CDFIs and mainstream 
lenders in financing historically underserved small businesses. The existing research primarily focuses on 
the benefits available through the Community Reinvestment Act to banks when they partner with CDFIs, 
2not on the factors that might influence these relationships.2 Our study is an effort to fill that gap. We 
offer a preliminary analysis of the nature of bank-CDFI interaction in small business lending. We examine 
the experience of six different CDFIs that vary by size, corporate structure, and market. We explore how 
they both collaborate and compete with regulated lenders, and how changes in local and national market 
dynamics affect their activities. Our case studies are not necessarily representative of the CDFI industry 
overall, but they offer insights on the factors that shape CDFIs’ interactions with and responses to more 
mainstream institutions. Our findings are therefore more descriptive than prescriptive, although we offer 
suggestions for both CDFI practice and future research.
Context
Given the limited track records and comparatively weak credit histories of many small businesses in lower-
income markets, it is imperative that they develop personal relationships with prospective lenders. When 
a lender feels comfortable with the company’s management, business plan, and financial prospects, he or 
she may be more willing to rely less on traditional underwriting criteria when considering an application for 
financing. Such relationship-based lending has traditionally been more prevalent in smaller, community-
based banks whose employees are often more closely attuned to the capacities of local businesses and the 
dynamics of the local market. 
Yet the influence of such institutions has declined over time as the banking industry has undergone 
numerous mergers and acquisitions. The number of commercial banking institutions declined by 26.8 
percent from 1995 to 2007, resulting in more concentrated assets.3 In 2007, commercial banks with more 
than $1 billion in assets controlled 89.1 percent of the country’s banking assets compared with 77 percent 
in 1995. At the same time, banks with less than $100 million in assets made up only 1.5 percent of national 
banking assets in 2007, down from 7 percent in 1995.4 With the struggles facing the banking industry in 
2008 from a deteriorating residential and commercial real estate market and an economy in recession, these 
trends are likely be accelerated. A growing number of small and midsized banks face imminent failure and 
are actively seeking acquisition partners. In addition, other financial institutions have acquired many of the 
nation’s largest banks and thrifts, such as Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and National City. This further 
consolidates a substantial share of the nation’s banking operations in a small number of very large financial 
institutions. 
A major ramification of these merger and acquisitions is that fewer small-business lending decisions are 
made at the local level. In the interest of efficiency, banks increasingly concentrate many of their decision-
making operations at their national or regional headquarters, not in the more decentralized branches. Most 
of Bank of America’s lending decisions are made in Charlotte, for example, not in its thousands of branches 
across the country. To facilitate such centralized decision-making, conventional lenders increasingly rely 
on standardized risk assessment models. Such evaluations focus on borrower credit scores, equity, and 
collateral to quantify risk, and they place comparatively little weight on more qualitative information 
about the applicant and the peculiar characteristics of the local market. Automation in underwriting has 
made smaller loans more profitable for large banks.5 At the same time, it can be much more difficult for 
businesses to obtain affordable financing if they do not have as strong a credit history, an equity base, or 
underlying collateral, even though they may have other compensating strengths.6 With local loan officers 
less able to influence the ultimate lending decisions, prospective small business borrowers with more 
marginal track records may well choose not to approach larger banks for capital, believing that the banks 
will deny them because of their financial characteristics.7 Indeed, small business loan volumes tend to be 
lower in markets dominated by a small number of lenders.8
3The Role of CDFIs
The decline of smaller, more relationship-oriented banks and thrifts has created a void for other lenders 
to fill. One result has been the explosive growth in the number of CDFIs in the past 15 years. Spurred in 
considerable part by the establishment of the federal CDFI Fund and the willingness of foundations to seed 
and support community development finance, the number of CDFIs more than tripled from the mid-1990s 
to the mid-2000s.
Given the increasing range of products and services that CDFIs offer, it is difficult to pin down an exact 
number of organizations that provide small business financing. Three different types of CDFIs are 
engaged in such lending.9 Most entities are community development loan funds, self-regulated nonprofit, 
or for-profit entities. These organizations collectively offer a wide range of products, from micro loans to 
home-based entrepreneurs for as little as $500, to six-, seven-, and eight-figure loans to companies looking 
to expand their physical facilities. A number of the loan funds, such as Coastal Enterprises, Kentucky 
Highlands, and the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, trace their origins to the War on Poverty 
and the initial community development corporation movement of the 1960s.10 In contrast, both community 
development banks and community development credit unions (CDCUs), some of which trace their 
roots back to the 1940s, are federally insured depository institutions. Depending on their focus and capital 
position, the insured depositories may offer a similar range of small business financial products as the loan 
funds. 
CDCUs, for example, often specialize in micro-loans (under $35,000) as well as loans up to $100,000. 
Community development banks typically offer a fuller range of loan products, and frequently focus on 
larger commercial and industrial lending. As insured depositories, both types of institutions are subject 
to federal and state regulations to ensure their financial safety and soundness. Such oversight can lead 
to more conservative lending than might be typical of an unregulated loan fund; for example, regulators 
often discourage or prevent CDCUs and community development banks from making loans to poorly 
collateralized companies or making equity investments, fearing that the higher risk could jeopardize the 
lenders’ solvency. Because these institutions typically have fewer assets and lower profit margins than 
community loan funds, they also rarely have the liquidity to engage in riskier lending.11
The different capital structures of the various CDFIs further shape their financing activities and influence 
their relationships with conventional lenders. As illustrated in Table 1, the vast majority of the capital for 
both community development banks and CDCUs comes from individual and commercial deposits: 88 
and 85 percent, respectively.12 Smaller amounts come from borrowed funds (including secondary capital), 
while the remainder constitutes equity and retained earnings. The banks and CDCUs must compete with 
other insured depositories for deposits and other loan capital. They also must remain self-sufficient lest 
they incur sanctions from their regulators. Thus, one would expect to see them compete on some level with 
conventional lenders for the more profitable small business loans.
4Table 1: Selected Characteristics of Small Business Oriented CDFIs, FY 2006
Community 
Development 
Bank
Community 
Development 
Credit Union
Community 
Development 
Loan Fund
Organizational Type Depository Depository Non-depository
Self-Sufficiency Requirement? Yes Yes No
Capital Sources (as share of total capital)
 • Equity / Net Assets 9.0% 10.6% 31.4%
 • Loans 0.0% 2.3% 63.2%
 • Equity-Like Loans 0.0% 0.0% 5.4%
 • Shares / Deposits 88.4% 84.6% 0.0%
 • Other 2.6% 2.5% 0.0%
Source: Coalition of Community Development Financial Institutions, CDFI Data Project: FY 2006 (Arlington, VA: CCDFI, 2007), 
available at http://cdfi.org/index.php?page=dataproject-b (Accessed August 7, 2008).
The vast majority of community development loan funds, on the other hand, do not have a self-sufficiency 
mandate. In fact, relatively few of the organizations, particularly those primarily engaged in small business 
financing, earn enough to cover all their expenses. (The gap generally results from the technical assistance 
services that they offer current and potential borrowers.) A significant portion of both their operating and 
lending capital comes from public and philanthropic grants and below-market loans. Their strong net 
asset/equity positions an average of 31.4 percent of total assets, according to the most recent CDFI Fund 
data―give them more flexibility to make higher-risk loans and devote resources to more involved small 
business development activities.
As nondepositories, the loan funds generally do not compete with conventional lenders for capital. In fact, 
CDFIs’ primary source of loan capital has been mainstream financial institutions (see Figure 1). Both CDFI 
officials and mainstream lenders frequently consider their institutions as complementing each other. Loan 
fund representatives frequently claim that they refer “bankable” borrowers to their conventional lending 
partners. When more stable but not fully bankable businesses need a relatively large loan, the CDFIs and 
conventional lenders often finance the company together, with the CDFI’s loan taking a second position to 
that of the bank.
5Figure 1: Sources of Capital for Community Development Loan Funds, FY 2006
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Influence of De Novo Banks
Prior to the current credit crunch, the amount of conventional loan capital flowing to low- and moderate-
income communities had increased substantially, particularly since the early 1990s, largely the result 
of greater federal enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).13 Although the growth, 
particularly in the subprime industry, expanded accessibility to capital more for traditionally underserved 
borrowers, it does not appear to have changed the small business lending dynamics significantly. Our 
conversations with leaders throughout the CDFI industry suggest that larger banks are still not competing 
for borrowers with CDFI small business lenders. (The dynamics are somewhat different for residential 
lending.) For the most part, the increased bank presence in lower-income markets has contributed to greater 
financial support of CDFI small business lenders. Compelled by CRA to lend in these areas, conventional 
lenders acknowledge that CDFIs often can better serve certain types of borrowers, and they have been 
willing to provide them with financial support to do so. Although most of the support results from CRA 
considerations, some appears to represent a longer-term marketing strategy on the part of the mainstream 
lenders. To the extent that the CDFI can help stabilize and expand the borrower’s business, the company 
may “graduate” to a profitable banking relationship in the future.
The bank-CDFI dynamics may be changing with the growth of start-up, or de novo, financial institutions. 
As noted earlier, the spate of banking mergers and acquisitions has reduced the number of small and mid-
sized banks, particularly in certain markets. As part of the process, the merged institutions generally seek 
to streamline their operations and focus on their most profitable business lines. They consequently may 
devote fewer resources to certain market segments, including small businesses. The shift in focus, while 
potentially problematic for small business borrowers, creates an opportunity for other lenders, particularly 
those targeting undertapped niches.14 Between 2003 and 2007, 828 de novos opened throughout the 
country,15 with most opening in areas with high merger and acquisition activity.16 Many have been able to 
take advantage of the skills and expertise of individuals who were laid off during mergers or acquisitions.
Not surprisingly, the business models of de novo banks often focus on seemingly underserved markets. 
To generate earned income and satisfy their initial investors, de novos tend to be relatively aggressive 
small business lenders whose approach, in many ways, resembles that of CDFIs. The banks often focus on 
6particular types of companies or certain sized businesses, using relationship-based lending and the loan 
officers’ knowledge of the local markets to capture market share. To build their portfolios (to generate 
interest income), they may focus on newer or emerging markets where more established banks are not as 
active, as well as on somewhat higher-risk borrowers, whom other conventional lenders might shun.17 In 
theory, de novos would be potential competitors for CDFI small business lenders. However, de novos 
usually do not share the CDFIs’ mission to serve economically distressed markets. Research in the Chicago 
region finds that, compared with more established banks, de novos have a smaller share of their offices in 
low- or moderate-income communities, and they make a larger share of their small business loans to firms 
in higher-income areas.18 
Effects of a Struggling Economy
The weak national (and increasingly global) economy and the turmoil in the financial markets have further 
complicated matters for CDFIs, conventional lenders, and small business borrowers. The decline in the 
stock market has reduced many foundations’ endowments, thus limiting the funds available for community 
development. There are also signs of funder fatigue with CDFIs, as some of the major philanthropic 
supporters are rethinking their community development and program-related investment strategies. In 
response, there has been a steady drumbeat from the Opportunity Finance Network and others in the 
CDFI industry for loan funds to become more self-sufficient. One ramification is that CDFIs may find 
it necessary to make larger loans and work to serve and retain higher-performing clients rather than 
“graduating” them to bank financing. In competitive banking markets, this could lead mainstream banks 
and CDFIs to compete for the same types of clients.
At the same time, underwriting practices have tightened. According to recent reports, start-up and 
early-stage businesses, as well as smaller and less well-capitalized companies, are encountering tighter 
lending standards when they apply for conventional financing, including increased collateral and equity 
requirements.19 Large national banks such as JP Morgan Chase, PNC, and Wells Fargo have all grown more 
cautious with small business lending.20 The Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Survey on Bank 
Lending Practices in October 2008 found that 75 percent of the loan officers had tightened their lending 
standards for commercial and industrial loans to small firms, up from 50 percent in April 2008. Eighty-
five percent of the loan officers surveyed in October had applied stricter criteria to commercial real estate 
purchases in the past three months, and 90 percent reported tightening credit lines to small businesses.21 
The January 2008 survey found that the cutbacks in small business lending even affected loans partially 
guaranteed by the federal government. Indeed, funding for SBA 7(a) loans fell 14 percent between 2006 and 
2007.22
Credit tightening among conventional lenders would seem to create additional opportunities for CDFIs. 
The organizations might well see more loan requests from higher-quality companies as a result. The overall 
pullback in the debt market is likely to slow the development of de novos and thus limit a potential source 
of competition for CDFI small business lenders.23 On the other hand, the economic downturn affects 
the cash flow of many CDFI borrowers as well, and the decline in real estate values can reduce CDFIs’ 
underlying collateral position on their portfolios. Furthermore, the downturn appears to have depressed 
further the appetite of conventional lenders to provide CDFIs with equity-equivalent investments and 
other low-cost loans, which had been major contributors to the organizations’ growth in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. With less concessionary financing and growing concerns over existing portfolios, CDFIs 
may be less willing and able to take risks with objectively weaker borrowers. Their need to find more stable 
borrowers could put lead them to compete more often with mainstream banks for clients. Such competition 
would presumably be common among regulated CDFI small business lenders, given their need to assure 
regulators of their financial soundness. In addition, access to lending capital will continue to be a challenge 
for CDFIs, particularly as capital markets tighten.
7Our study explores how selected CDFI small business lenders are grappling with these various factors. 
To what extent are they competing with conventional lenders for prospective borrowers? How has their 
relationship with the mainstream lenders changed as a result of the broader economic forces at play? To 
what extent do conditions in the particular markets in which they operate affect those relationships? What 
are the most significant challenges facing the CDFIs in the short to medium term, and how are they trying 
to address them?
Methodology
Our analysis relies on case studies of six separate CDFIs across the country. In selecting the six 
organizations, we first identified the 15 most active CDFI small business lenders that primarily serve urban 
or metropolitan markets. (We relied on the CDFI Fund’s Community Investment Impact Survey [CIIS] 
and the CDFI Data Project [CDP] for the data.24) From these 15, we chose organizations that reflected 
a mix of organization type (community development banks, credit unions, and loan funds), market size, 
product offerings, and geography. We ultimately selected the following organizations: ACCION Texas 
(San Antonio, TX), Colorado Enterprise Fund (Denver, CO), Cooperative Business Assistance Corporation 
(Camden, NJ), Santa Cruz Community Credit Union (Santa Cruz, CA), Shorebank (Chicago, IL), and 
University National Bank (St. Paul, MN). These organizations’ basic characteristics are outlined in Table 2. 
Appendices A and B provide more details on the study and interviews. 
Table 2: Characteristics of Case Study CDFIs
ACCION Texas
Colorado 
Enterprise 
Fund
Cooperative 
Business 
Assistance 
Corporation
Santa Cruz 
Community 
Credit Union
Shorebank
University 
Bank
Location San Antonio, TX Denver, CO Camden, NJ Santa Cruz, CA Chicago, IL St. Paul, MN
CDFI Type Loan Fund Loan Fund Loan Fund Credit Union Bank Bank
Assets $18,937,074 $4,000,000 $12,629,142 $58,000,000 $2,000,000,000 $117,000,000
Geography Served Statewide Statewide Multi-County Small Urban Large Urban Large Urban
Date Established 1994 1976 1987 1977 1973 1994
Borrower Characteristics
Start-Up Business 55% 40% 22% 10% 5% 15%
Minority-Owned Business 86% 29% 40% 35% 90% NA
Woman-Owned Business 45% 46% 37% 25% 60% NA
Percent of All Small Business Loans
In conducting the case studies, we focused on how CDFIs have responded to changes in their particular 
markets and in the nature of their relationships with mainstream small business lenders. To that end, 
we interviewed the CDFI directors and key small business lending staff to understand the origins and 
products of the organizations, the types of customers served, their relationship with mainstream lenders, 
and their perceptions of and responses to conditions in their markets. To obtain a broader perspective 
of the small business lending environments, we interviewed key officials from local small business 
development centers (SBDCs), community development corporations, and other smaller CDFIs active in 
the markets. These individuals shed light on the particular financial needs of the respective small business 
communities and also provided a sense of the roles local lenders play in addressing those needs. We also 
interviewed conventional lenders who have both a significant presence in the selected small business 
markets, particularly in lower-income areas within those markets, and relationships with the selected CDFIs. 
We asked these lenders to describe how their institutions have served the needs of local companies, the 
products and outreach programs they use to serve businesses in low- and moderate-income communities, 
and their (and their institutions’) relationship with CDFIs in the selected markets. When possible, we 
augmented the qualitative interviews with data on the number, amount, and type of small business loans 
being made in the different communities. The majority of interviews and research for these case studies was 
conducted between January and May 2008.
8ACCION Texas
Outside the technology industry, budding entrepreneurs have frequently struggled to obtain the necessary 
capital to develop and expand their businesses. The problem has been particularly pronounced for 
immigrants who have limited or damaged credit histories, as they usually cannot meet the automated 
underwriting thresholds of mainstream banks. ACCION Texas was established in 1994 to help address the 
dilemma. Drawing on successful international micro-lending programs, the San Antonio-based organization 
focused on providing small loans to budding entrepreneurs who generally cannot obtain the needed 
financing from mainstream sources. Through its 12 offices across the state, ACCION now makes between 
80 and 90 loans each month for upwards of $1 million (collectively).
ACCION lends to both start-ups and existing businesses and primarily works with relatively 
unsophisticated borrowers who do not keep good financial records and consequently cannot quantify their 
success to a mainstream bank.  Most of ACCION’s borrowers are minority-owned businesses, and about 
one-half of these businesses are owned by women. The typical borrower has a credit score of 570, well 
below the usual threshold for conventional lenders, and ACCION lends to individuals with scores as low 
as 500. The organization makes loans from as little as $500 to $50,000. Eighty percent of its loans are under 
$35,000, and an average loan ranges from $15,000 to $20,000. Virtually all of the loans are for working 
capital, inventory, or the purchase of equipment. Most ACCION borrowers take out multiple loans in a 
“step borrowing” process; once they successfully repay a smaller loan they become eligible for a larger one.
In many ways, ACCION operates much more like a for-profit bank than a traditional nonprofit CDFI. 
Financial self-sufficiency is a distinct organizational goal. (ACCION currently covers about 70 percent of 
its costs internally, well above the average for CDFI micro-lenders.) The organization offers comparatively 
little technical assistance to actual and prospective borrowers, generally referring individuals who need help 
structuring their business plans, for example, to a small business development center or other business coun-
seling firms. ACCION has developed its own automated credit-scoring model from data it has collected dur-
ing the past 13 years and uses the model to make decisions on loan applications within 24 hours of receiving 
them. The model represents a deliberate attempt both to increase the organization’s loan volume and to 
lower its transaction costs, thus maximizing its financial return. It takes into account both demographic and 
financial variables, including the business owner’s length of time at his or her current residence, homeowner-
ship status, debt-to-income ratio, credit score, and expenses.25 Approved loans are subsequently priced for 
risk, with more marginal borrowers receiving higher interest rates (up to the high teens) and smaller loans. 
Only those borrowers with credit scores of at least 600 are eligible for the maximum $50,000 loan. ACCION 
requires that all its loans be fully collateralized or otherwise supported by tangible assets. Borrowers lacking 
sufficient collateral must pay a nonrefundable fee equal to 5 percent of the loan, which goes directly into 
ACCION’s loan loss reserve.  To generate additional earned revenue, ACCION underwrites loans for three 
other CDFIs using its credit-scoring model.  It also services their micro-loan portfolios. ACCION hopes to 
increase to 15 the number of CDFIs to which it sells such services within the next five years. 
For the most part, ACCION encounters little competition from conventional lenders. Few regulated 
lenders are interested in making small loans to high-risk business borrowers, particularly without the 
benefit of an SBA guarantee. They are interested, however, in building relationships with ACCION in the 
hopes of capturing the CDFI’s small business borrowers once they outgrow ACCION. ACCION’s initial 
capitalization in 1994 consisted of $125,000 in zero-interest loans from four separate banks. It continues to 
receive both operating support and low-interest loan capital from conventional institutions, particularly the 
more recent entrants into the San Antonio and Texas markets. Capital One, for example, recently moved 
into the Texas market when it acquired a large local bank and has been assiduously working to establish a 
formal referral process with ACCION. This will allow it to help its customers who cannot meet the bank’s 
underwriting standards, while simultaneously being a go-to lender for ACCION graduates. In supporting 
ACCION, including seating officers on ACCION’s governing board and loan committee, Capital One 
hopes to establish a mutually beneficial “continuum of credit.” Other banks that are relatively new to the 
9Texas market have taken similar approaches in their efforts both to steal customers from other banks and to 
develop new customers from underserved and emerging markets.  Working through ACCION becomes a 
logical strategy.
Although most banks actively seek to partner with ACCION, Executive Director Janie Barrera notes two 
exceptions: Innovative Bank and Superior Financial Group. Both are based in California and have actively 
marketed $5,000 to $15,000 SBA-backed loans to start-ups and home-based businesses. These institutions 
do not take small business deposits, and they do not offer any business development services. Prospective 
borrowers fill out a streamlined application online and pay a $500 application fee. Loan approvals are 
based almost entirely on the individuals’ credit scores, as applicants are not required to provide prior tax 
returns or information on their business plans. Innovative and Superior market their products nationally 
through seminars at local small business development centers, chambers of commerce, and community 
development corporations. Sue Malone, Superior’s President of Small Business Strategies, who previously 
worked for Innovative Bank, has originated 20,000 such loans in the past five years.
Although Innovative and Superior appear to have found a niche in the micro-business market, it is unclear 
how much of a threat they represent to an organization such as ACCION. Malone views CDFIs not 
as competitors, but as partners that serve a different segment of the small business market, specifically 
individuals and companies that cannot meet the bank’s underwriting threshold. Barrera concurs, at least to 
a point, believing that the institutions are unwilling to go as low on the credit score ladder as ACCION.  
Like many banks that have specialized in higher-risk markets, Innovative and Superior have not yet survived 
an extended economic downturn.  The general weakness in the business environment has already caused a 
similar small business lender, Business Loan Express, to curtail its lending, and there is some indication that 
Innovative Bank itself has cut back significantly as it struggles to deal with underperforming assets.
The most challenging issue for ACCION is obtaining adequate loan capital.  The organization disperses 
nearly 100 percent of its available funds every month, with repayments generally covering new requests. Yet 
in December 2007, ACCION had more than $200,000 in new loan requests it could not meet because of 
lacking loan capital.  The problem has multiple causes. Bank mergers tend to reduce the amount invested in 
the CDFI; the merged institution typically makes only half as much in grants and loans to the organization 
as the previous institutions had made separately. Merger activity in Texas has reduced the number of banks 
that might invest in ACCION. Most recently, JP Morgan Chase acquired Washington Mutual Bank and 
Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia. All four entities had a presence in Texas markets and were active funders of 
CDFIs. It remains to be seen what funding level the combined Washington Mutual/JP Morgan Chase and 
Wachovia/Wells Fargo will provide to CDFIs.  Banks also appear to have changed how they approach loans 
to the organization. According to both Barrera and some of the organization’s investors, banks no longer 
view ACCION as a charity, but more as a financial institution with a bottom line.  They consequently 
underwrite loans to ACCION as they would to any financial institution.  Banks want an economic return 
on their investment, not simply CRA credit or a tax write-off; they need ACCION to demonstrate how 
the loan will benefit the bank as well as the CDFI. The changing environment has led ACCION to expand 
its own capital outreach efforts. For example, it purchased a share in (and received a seat on the board of) 
the for-profit Texas Mezzanine Fund (TMF), a multibank CDFI that provides both residential and small 
business loans throughout the state. ACCION has received a $250,000 loan from TMF, but hopes that its 
involvement with the organization will create new partnership opportunities with TMF’s investor banks.
Colorado Enterprise Fund
As in Texas, emerging businesses in Colorado frequently struggle to obtain financing from mainstream 
lenders. Banks in the Denver and Front Range areas are extremely reluctant to make micro-loans, 
particularly to start-ups and other companies with limited collateral, limited equity, or owners with personal 
credit issues. The interest that could be earned on the small loans simply is not worth the underwriting 
effort, and the resulting loan-to-value ratios would exceed lenders’ and their regulators’ comfort levels.
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The nonprofit Colorado Enterprise Fund (CEF) was created in 1976 to help emerging companies and 
entrepreneurs that could not obtain financing from traditional sources. Headquartered in Denver, CEF 
serves the entire state, although the bulk of its activity takes place in the Front Range Urban Corridor 
(the area east of the Rockies stretching from the Wyoming boarder to Pueblo). The organization offers 
loans ranging in size from $1,000 to $250,000, with an average of $30,000. CEF focuses on traditionally 
underserved businesses, particularly those owned by women, ethnic minorities, and low-income individuals. 
Roughly 46 percent of CEF’s loans are to women-owned businesses, and 29 percent are to minority-
owned businesses. It will lend to any type of non-“sin” business (no bars or liquor stores) but tries to target 
companies with the potential to create significant numbers of jobs. Nearly nine in ten of its borrowers are 
micro-businesses, and CEF consequently relies heavily on capital from the SBA micro-loan program. The 
CDFI augments its core lending efforts with management consulting and training services, including a 
“Bizworks” education program, and it has developed special lending initiatives for child care facilities and 
teen entrepreneurs.
CEF is primarily a cash flow lender, with the business’s collateral taking secondary importance. For loans 
under $35,000 (that is, most of its loans), CEF uses an internal rating system similar to ACCION’s to guide 
its decision making. Like ACCION, CEF developed its model based on its experience. It also incorporated 
underwriting practices set forth in the early 2000s by the Opportunity Finance Network. CEF’s system 
focuses on eight criteria that include assessments of company cash flow and collateral and the owner’s 
credit history. The approach has enabled the organization to respond to applicants within a few days. 
For loans greater than $35,000, CEF staff members conduct more thorough analyses of the prospective 
borrower, paying closer attention to the underlying collateral and both the historical and projected cash 
flow and related financial information. These larger loans require the approval of CEF’s loan committee, 
which typically adds up to 10 days to the approval process. Most of the larger loans serve as gap financing 
for companies and are in junior position relative to conventional bank loans to the company. Without 
CEF’s participation in the transaction, the company would be unable to access any bank financing. The 
organization continues to augment its lending with business and financial management counseling. CEF’s 
typical borrower has a credit score of 625 and an annual income of $39,000. Roughly 40 percent of the 
fund’s borrowers are start-up businesses. The average interest rate charged on loans is 10.7 percent, and the 
average loan term is 52 months. CEF’s average interest rates are higher than some of the other case study 
CDFIs primarily due to the larger share of small loans and loans to start-up firms that CEF originates.
Like ACCION Texas, CEF benefits from a generally collaborative relationship with conventional lenders 
active in the Front Range market. Banks continue to provide the organization with both operating and loan 
capital, including three equity-like investments in the past year alone. The banks derive distinct non-CRA 
benefits from the CEF relationship as well. They are able to refer to CEF existing small business depositors 
who could not meet their loan standards, thus enabling the companies to obtain their needed financing 
while retaining them as depositors and potential future customers. CEF frequently refers its borrowers to 
its partner banks for deposit services, as well as for loans once the companies have developed enough to be 
“bankable.” As noted earlier, CEF also will lend in partnership with mainstream banks on larger deals that 
the banks are unwilling to make themselves.
There is little overlap between the banks’ and CEF’s borrowers. Up to two-thirds of CEF’s borrowers come 
to the organization from area banks; most of these companies are “pre-bankable,” in that they lack the 
credit history, collateral position, or capital needed to meet the banks’ underwriting criteria. Because CEF’s 
interest rates tend to be higher than those of the banks, it is more advantageous for “bankable” borrowers 
to go to conventional institutions for financing. On occasion, CEF will finance a bankable borrower that 
had previously received a smaller loan from the organization and prefers the CEF relationship. It is more 
common for CEF to receive applications from businesses that could qualify for a bank loan, in which cases 
the organization typically refers those companies directly to one of its partner banks. The organization has 
not reported any competition of note from a regulated institution, including de novos in the Front Range.
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CEF’s partnerships with conventional lenders periodically have been affected by changes in the local 
financial markets. In the early 2000s, for example, Colorado’s economy and real estate market was attractive 
to speculators looking either to acquire existing banks or to form new banks. Although these new banks 
rarely competed directly with CEF for borrowers, they frequently lured away loan and CRA officers from 
CEF’s bank partners. The turnover disrupted some of CEF’s relationships with these institutions, in terms 
of both borrower referrals and capital support.
Capital remains the critical challenge for CEF. As a way of helping to increase its self-sufficiency (and thus 
its net asset base), CEF has been trying to make larger loans, typically those in the $70,000 to $100,000 
range. Larger loans require less maintenance per dollar, and the borrowers tend to be more stable. Yet these 
deals fall outside the SBA micro-loan program, which has traditionally been CEF’s primary source of loan 
capital. The need for flexible capital may well become more pronounced with the move by conventional 
lenders toward increasingly conservative small business underwriting standards. Sharon King, the Director 
of the Boulder Small Business Development Corporation, explained that banks now have much stricter 
credit score requirements, place greater importance on collateral, and are more aggressively calling lines 
of credit. CEF Executive Director Ceyl Prinster anticipates an emerging demand for more flexible lenders 
willing to address financing gaps through innovative, relationship-based underwriting, and already notes an 
uptick in the number of bank referrals that the organization has received. 
Cooperative Business Assistance Corporation
Based in Camden, New Jersey, the nonprofit Cooperative Business Assistance Corporation (CBAC) has 
been providing financial assistance to small and emerging businesses in the six-county southern New Jersey 
region since 1987. The region consists of Philadelphia suburbs, one of the most economically distressed 
cities in the country (Camden), Atlantic City, the largely unpopulated Pine Barrens area, and some of the 
state’s more productive agricultural land. Although New Jersey overall has the highest population density in 
the country and thus qualifies as one of the more economically vibrant states, its southern region has long 
been comparatively weak economically. CBAC works to promote and sustain development in the region by 
supporting companies with a solid likelihood of future growth.
Much of CBAC’s market lies within the Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington metropolitan statistical area, 
the country’s fifth largest. Although the area is generally well served by conventional banks, many of its 
small businesses cannot meet the lenders’ underwriting standards. These prospective borrowers frequently 
have low credit scores, little equity or collateral, and little history of banking with a mainstream financial 
institution. Gary Rago, the Regional Director for the New Jersey Small Business Development Corporation, 
also notes the dearth of lenders who can devote the time and resources to work with entrepreneurs 
who can communicate their business ideas but lack the skill sets to translate their visions into feasible, 
bankable plans. One of the biggest challenges the SBDC encounters, for instance, is its clients’ inability 
to communicate to lenders a budget for their business ideas. Such small businesses compose a significant 
portion of CBAC’s portfolio. The CDFI targets most of its services to entrepreneurs and companies that 
cannot obtain financing from conventional bank sources. Many of these borrowers need smaller loans 
than are profitable for mainstream lenders, do not meet the banks’ credit or collateral standards, or need 
considerable technical assistance in order to use credit effectively. 
CBAC tailors its financing to meet the particular needs of its borrowers. For start-ups, which constitute 
about 22 percent of CBAC’s portfolio, CBAC makes micro-loans for as little as $1,000. In Atlantic City 
and Camden, it will offer loans for working capital, inventory, and equipment purchase of up to $150,000 
with five-year terms and fixed interest rates. For businesses based in these cities that have been in operation 
for at least two years, CBAC will make fixed-asset loans of up to $500,000. These notes are primarily 
designed to finance the acquisition, construction, or renovation of commercial real estate. They carry 
15-year terms and fixed interest rates that are determined on a case-by-case basis. Camden companies can 
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also obtain emergency loans of up to $6,000 to address unforeseen building repair issues and short-term 
financial catastrophes. The typical CBAC small business borrower receives a $15,000 loan with a maturity 
that may extend for up to six years. CBAC generally underwrites on the basis of a company’s positive cash 
flow, but it will make exceptions for businesses with strong management and compelling business plans. It 
requires that all small business owners sign for their loans and take full personal responsibility. The average 
CBAC borrower has a credit score of 635 and an average income of $35,000 per year. Roughly 40 percent 
of CBAC’s loans are to minority-owned businesses, and 37 percent are to women-owned businesses. The 
average interest rate on CBAC loans was 6.8 percent.
The CDFI views itself ultimately as a gap lender, one that will work with comparatively marginal companies 
to help them reach a position where they can qualify for straight bank financing. It therefore considers 
more conventional lenders to be partners, not competitors. According to Executive Director Mike Diemer, 
if one of the bankers on CBAC’s loan review committee thought that his or her institution could finance a 
deal that was under review, the deal would be taken off the table and referred to that bank. CBAC operates 
its loan funds in collaboration with eight mainstream lenders; it uses borrowed funds from the banks to 
lend in particular areas, and it lends in partnership with those banks to companies that require larger loans 
than CBAC can provide on its own. (CBAC’s loans take a subordinate position to those of the banks.) It 
also offers a loan guarantee program in Camden and Atlantic City, through which it purchases a certificate 
of deposit in the originating bank for up to 40 percent of the loan amount, or $75,000, whichever is less.  
The guarantees can extend for up to 10 years and are intended to help nascent small businesses establish 
relationships with mainstream banks.  
The relationship with CBAC has numerous benefits for the banks. CBAC helps the conventional lenders 
build a presence in low-income, underserved markets. The banks can take advantage of the CDFI’s 
underwriting and its knowledge of the Camden, Atlantic City, and other south Jersey small business 
environments to make loans that boost their CRA ratings. By making the loans through CBAC, the 
banks also avoid placing higher-risk loans on their books. CBAC not only helps generate potential future 
small business customers for the banks, but it also enables banks to keep some of their current customers. 
CBAC’s bank partners have periodically referred existing small business depositors to CBAC for loans; 
the companies could not meet the individual bank’s underwriting criteria, and rather than risk the business 
taking its deposits to another institution that might look more favorably on its request, the banks have 
recommended that it approach CBAC for financing.
Not surprisingly, CBAC’s focus on higher-risk borrowers and its emphasis on providing technical assistance 
prevent it from covering its costs internally. The organization is not self-sufficient and does not believe 
that such a goal is realistic. Achieving self-sufficiency would likely require that CBAC either cut back its 
business counseling services considerably, charge higher rates on its loans, charge its partner banks higher 
fees for loan participations, or focus its lending on more stable businesses that need larger loans. Each of 
these options would limit the organization’s ability to serve the weaker, nascent companies that it has long 
targeted. Another option would be to raise enough capital to increase its loan volume and thus the overall 
size of its portfolio, but that appears unlikely in light of the uncertainty in the capital markets and CBAC’s 
limited staff. The organization will therefore continue to rely on grants and very low-cost capital to make 
ends meet. CBAC receives operating support from its bank partners, through Community Development 
Block Grant allocations, and from occasional foundation grants. In addition to lending capital for its micro-
loan program, it receives grant money from the SBA to help cover the costs of its small business counseling 
programs. It has received grant and other low-cost capital from the federal CDFI Fund and Economic 
Development Administration, and it has a contract with the New Jersey Economic Development Authority 
for a Hispanic/Latino business mentoring initiative.
CBAC is well positioned to take advantage of the problems affecting many conventional lenders, although 
it likely will have to raise additional capital in the next few years. Rago explains that many small business 
borrowers have used their residences as collateral and declining real estate values could result in banks 
resetting rates to account for the reduced collateral. Such scenarios could push borrowers who had been 
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marginally bankable toward more character-oriented lenders such as the CDFI. Similarly, officials at 
CBAC’s partner banks note both the general credit tightening among mainstream lenders and the higher 
business operating costs resulting from higher-priced oil and other raw materials. These factors may 
well make it more difficult for less established companies to satisfy the banks’ automated credit-scoring 
thresholds. The officials also see potential servicing opportunities for CBAC, as banks will perceive a need 
for greater monitoring of their small business portfolios.
Santa Cruz Community Credit Union
Santa Cruz County, located about 50 miles south of San Jose, California, serves two different markets. 
The northern part of the county contains its namesake city, home to a University of California branch and 
the National Surfer Hall of Fame. Residents tend to be relatively affluent, with many commuting over the 
mountains to work in Silicon Valley. Concern for the environment runs strong, and many residents have 
consistently pushed back against proposed development. The southern part of the county tends to be more 
agricultural in orientation and comparatively poorer. The area surrounding Watsonville has long been one 
of the major strawberry producing regions in the country and has long been home to a large migrant worker 
population. While the Santa Cruz area tends to be predominantly non-Hispanic, the Watsonville area has a 
substantial Latino population.
Frustrated with the seeming unwillingness of mainstream banks to serve the needs of lower-income 
communities in the county, a group of Santa Cruz housing and consumer advocates founded the Santa 
Cruz Community Credit Union (SCCCU) in 1977. Even as banks have become more active in such 
markets as a result of CRA and other motivations, the basic operating premise of the credit union has 
remained the same. Members contend that the conventional banking system is fundamentally flawed and 
that community-controlled capital is essential to meet the financial needs of the county’s poorer residents 
and communities.
According to officials at the county’s small business development center, access to financing continues 
to prove problematic for many low-margin service businesses such as child care centers and for emerging 
minority-owned businesses. Latino-owned companies in the Watsonville area in particular face difficulties 
obtaining such capital. These businesses frequently have relatively weak or limited credit histories, limited 
management experience, thin capital bases, and limited collateral. At the same time, they generally require 
small amounts of credit. SCCCU has always targeted these types of companies. The credit union provides 
a wide range of options, including equipment and vehicle loans, commercial real estate financing, working 
capital loans and lines of credit, SBA 7(a) loan guarantees, and business credit cards. The vast majority of 
its loans are less than $50,000, and about 19 percent qualify as micro-loans (under $25,000). Among its 
specialized product areas are child care, solar energy, and energy efficiency, each of which was developed in 
response to voids in the market. SCCCU also targets agricultural businesses, arts and cultural nonprofits, 
and business cooperatives. As of March 31, 2008, the credit union had 56 small business loans totaling 
$10.1 million in its portfolio.26
The credit union has succeeded in serving these companies through classic relationship lending. Loan 
officers will take the time to make loans as small as $5,000, working closely with the business owner to 
understand his or her plan and evaluate its likelihood of success. They typically handle all phases of 
the lending process, not involving other departments or lenders, which allows them to develop better 
relationships with the individual owners. SCCCU primarily lends against cash flow, requiring debt service 
coverage ratios of 1.15 or more. If the prospective borrower lacks the historical profitability to demonstrate 
such coverage capacity, the credit union will accept projections and assess their reasonableness. For these 
borrowers and for those with insufficient collateral, SCCCU will use SBA or other loan guarantee products 
to support the loans, provided that the business plan seems realistic and that some likely social benefit will 
ensue. The typical SCCCU borrower has a credit score of 680 and an average annual income of roughly 
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$40,000. The credit union largely lends to existing businesses; only 10 percent of their loans are to start-up 
firms. The average interest rate on small business loans is 6.3 percent and loans typically have a term of 
three to four years. Thirty-five percent of SCCCU’s loans are to minority-owned firms, and 25 percent are 
to women-owned firms.
The credit union’s emphasis on relationship lending has become increasingly important as many of the 
locally chartered banks in the county disappear. In 2003, Union Bank of California acquired Monterrey 
Bay Bank. In 2004, Greater Bay Bank bought the Santa Cruz-based Coast Commercial Bank, which had 
been instrumental in helping the city recover after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake; Greater Bay Bank 
subsequently merged with Wells Fargo. In 2006, RaboBank acquired the Community Bank of Central 
California, a Salinas-based institution that had been active in the southern part of Santa Cruz County. 
Although the acquiring banks have actively solicited small businesses, the general sense among both SBDC 
and credit union officials is that none has been willing to focus as much on the community relationships 
that their acquired banks had developed. Wells Fargo, for example, is seen as noticeably less responsive to 
local small business needs.
One response to the changing market dynamics has been the emergence of two Santa Cruz-based de novo 
institutions: Santa Cruz County Bank (established in 2004) and Lighthouse Bank (created in 2007). Both 
are reasonably well capitalized for their age ($168.6 million and $33.8 million in total assets, respectively, 
as of March 31, 2008) and have been aggressive lenders in the small business marketplace. Collectively, the 
two institutions had $9.3 million in small business loans on their books at the end of the first quarter, in 
addition to $26.4 million in commercial real estate notes.27 Many of the loan officers at these institutions 
had worked at other local banks prior to the banks’ acquisition, and they brought their knowledge of the 
local small business market and their relationships to the start-up institutions. With the emergence of these 
de novo banks, SCCCU officials believe there are no longer unmet small business needs in the Santa Cruz 
and northern Monterrey County market.
Aside from occasional joint efforts to provide financial literacy training to area residents, SCCCU and 
other area financial institutions tend to be competitors for both their deposit and small business customers. 
Conventional institutions could meet many if not most of the credit union members’ basic financial needs. 
In fact, many members also have accounts with some of the larger banks. Those both within and outside 
the credit union acknowledge that SCCCU’s major appeal to more affluent depositors with a choice of 
institutions is one of social mission and customer service. This commitment to the community continues to 
set the credit union apart from the other institutions in the area and represents a key competitive advantage. 
SCCCU also has relatively little competition from other lenders on its small, high-touch business loans. 
“Many of our borrowers are unsophisticated small business owners that do not know what is available or 
how to go about obtaining capital,” explains Loan Officer Randy Johnson. “Our mission is to assist these 
borrowers by educating them as to what services are available and how to tap into them.” For the most 
part, the banks are unwilling to put the time and resources into underwriting these higher-risk borrowers on 
transactions unlikely to generate much, if any, profit.
In larger business loans, SCCCU encounters much stiffer competition. Both it and the de novos have 
emphasized relationship-based lending and frequently compete for the same customers. Credit union 
lenders report that SCCCU’s borrowers are “constantly solicited” by mainstream banks, and that 
commercial banks have “numerous sales people with substantial sales goals on the street at all times 
soliciting business [and] entire departments dedicated to products” the credit union offers. Santa Cruz 
County Bank in particular has been “overly aggressive” in this regard. The larger banks can often better the 
credit union on price, they have a greater ability to bundle loan products and small business services, and 
they have much higher lending limits than SCCCU. Such characteristics prove advantageous to some of 
the credit union’s existing small business customers as they grow. Furthermore, the banks’ branch networks 
tend to be much more visible than the credit union, which has only two branches (in Santa Cruz and 
Watsonville).
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In addition to developing the child care and environmental products described earlier, SCCCU has taken 
other steps to increase its attractiveness to potential borrowers. It now offers a “Quick Cash” line of credit 
of up to $25,000. The line of credit uses flexible underwriting standards, features a short application 
process, and offers rapid approval. The credit union now offers 24-hour loans both online and over the 
phone. SCCCU remains at a slight disadvantage, though, as it lacks the resources to match the banks in 
technological capacity. It is also subject to regulatory lending limits on the basis of its relatively small size. 
Credit union officials believe that the general tightening of credit among conventional lenders may create 
additional business opportunities. Officials at $8 billion Rabobank, for example, stated that troubles in 
the housing market could impact small business owners’ personal credit scores. Because many individuals 
pledge their homes as collateral, declining real estate values could force the borrowers to come up with 
additional sources to restore the diminished collateral. That would likely tighten the underwriting criteria 
on smaller business deals generally. Other CDFIs active in the greater Santa Cruz area have already seen 
increased demand for their products as bank credit has become more restrictive. The aggressive lending 
on the part of the de novos could also ultimately benefit the credit union, if either enough of the loans 
default and raise safety and soundness concerns among the banks’ regulators, or if the de novos’ success 
causes them to be acquired by larger institutions with less interest in a relationship-based approach to small 
business finance. Yet SCCCU itself can be only so flexible in its underwriting and take on so much risk 
without raising concerns among its own regulators.
Shorebank
Shorebank is widely credited as being the first community development bank in the United States. 
Founded in Chicago in 1973 as South Shore Bank, the institution emerged as a response to the financial 
disinvestment in the city’s lower-income neighborhoods. A group of local activists mobilized enough 
capital to purchase a mainstream bank branch in the city’s South Shore neighborhood that was scheduled 
for consolidation. They obtained a new charter and focused on providing loans and financial services 
designed to help stabilize and ultimately revitalize South Shore.28 The bank’s success in pursuing its dual 
mission attracted considerable attention among policymakers (Bill and Hillary Clinton’s interest in the 
model helped provide the impetus for the federal CDFI Fund) and also spurred efforts to replicate the 
bank elsewhere. Shorebank now has 12 branches in the Chicago area, Cleveland, and Detroit, and nonbank 
affiliates in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and the Pacific Northwest. With more than $2 billion in assets, 
Shorebank is one of the largest CDFIs in the country. We limit our study to the bank’s efforts in the greater 
Chicago market.
A full-service bank, Shorebank offers deposit services, residential mortgages, and consumer loans in 
addition to its small business products. It has four full-service branches on Chicago’s south side, one on the 
far north side of the city, and two in western Cook County (the result of its recent acquisition of Greater 
Chicago Bank). The bank has traditionally focused on small businesses and neighborhoods underserved by 
mainstream lenders. In particular, Shorebank has targeted minority-owned businesses, franchises, churches, 
small to mid-sized nonprofits, and child care centers. It initially concentrated on activities designed to help 
develop South Shore and the surrounding communities, but it has since broadened its scope to include 
socially responsible banking and investing. Vickie Battle, Shorebank’s Director of Business Banking, 
stresses that the bank lends throughout the Chicago region but places the most emphasis on lending in the 
neighborhoods surrounding its branches.
Shorebank’s small business loans tend to be larger than those of the other CDFIs in our study. In 2005, for 
example, the bank’s average small business loan in the Chicago area was $228,000. Shorebank continues 
to target smaller companies as well, however. Forty-six percent of its loans in 2005 were less than $100,000, 
and the average of those loans was $61,000. The average interest rate for Shorebank’s small business 
loans is 7.0 percent, and the average loan term is five years. The bank recently divided its commercial 
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and industrial lending division into two parts. One focuses on larger companies in need of larger loans, 
while the community lending component works with customers seeking loans of under $250,000 and 
with companies generating less than $1 million in annual revenues. The bank has always augmented its 
lending with efforts to help increase its current and prospective borrowers’ management and operational 
capacities. One such vehicle was the affiliated Shorebank Neighborhood Institute, which provided a range of 
business development services in addition to micro-loans and energy financing. With the recent dissolution 
of Shorebank Neighborhood Institute as a separate entity, the bank either offers those services itself or, 
more frequently, refers individuals and organizations to its small business development partners in the 
communities. Shorebank has been effective at lending to minority- and women-owned businesses. Roughly 
90 percent of the bank’s small business loans were to minority-owned firms, and 60 percent were to women-
owned businesses. The bank does not target start-up businesses. Only 5 percent of the bank’s small business 
loans went to new firms.
Chicago has long been a major financial center with a strong tradition of community activism. 
Organizations such as the National Training and Information Center, the Woodstock Institute, the 
Woodlawn Organization, and others were instrumental in calling attention to discriminatory lending 
practices involving minorities and low-income communities, and they have been steady advocates on 
behalf of legislation such as the CRA and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. They have continued to 
monitor banks’ lending in the region’s lower-income markets and have not shied away from publicly 
calling certain institutions to task for weaker performance. In addition, Chicago’s size and ethnic diversity 
have contributed to the formation of numerous new institutions seeking to exploit perceived niches in the 
marketplace; 41 of the locally chartered banks active in 2007 had been formed since 2000 (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 2008c). As a result, Chicago is one of the most competitive small business banking 
cities in the country. Lenders routinely compete for small business loans, especially in the region’s poorer 
communities.
Shorebank consequently faces competition from both more established and de novo banks for both 
deposits and small business financing. Like most banks, Shorebank’s primary source of capital is 
deposits. Yet most of the bank’s branches are located in low-income communities with weak deposit 
bases. Complicating matters has been the boom in bank branches throughout the city, with larger banks 
increasing their branch presence in lower-income and minority communities. For example, since 2003, 
large national banks and thrifts such as JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Washington Mutual, Citibank, 
National City, and Fifth Third have all opened up new branches in communities where Shorebank branches 
are located.29 Shorebank has sought to market its social mission orientation to prospective depositors 
beyond its geographic footprints; it has frequently advertised in the New Yorker magazine, for example. 
However, such efforts come with a price. The bank’s cost of funds tends to be higher than that of its larger 
competitors, often closer to the five-year Treasury note than to the London Interbank Offered Rate. As a 
result, Shorebank frequently loses out on deals to other banks if the determining factor is the price of the 
loan. Bank officials acknowledge the need to invest more significantly in technology in the near future to 
attract more deposits from small business owners; building the deposit base is critical for potential cross-
selling opportunities.
In light of these constraints, Shorebank has necessarily focused both on its ability to develop relationships 
with customers and on the development of certain lending niches such as franchises and smaller and 
medium-sized nonprofits. In addition, Shorebank has actively worked to fill gaps in lending to churches, 
other faith-based businesses, and child care centers. Unlike many of its larger competitors, the bank offers 
flexible underwriting that does not rely heavily on credit scoring. Shorebank’s reorganization of its small 
business lending division represents one effort to capitalize on its strength in relationship-based lending, 
and the bank continues to be an active originator of SBA-guaranteed loans. Its franchise lending model has 
been successful enough that other lenders are seeking to copy it, and Shorebank has recently seen increased 
competition in lending to franchises.30 At the same time, Shorebank struggles to lend to independent retail 
establishments in its targeted communities. In part, this stems from the relatively weak commercial presence 
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in neighborhoods such as Austin, Bronzeville, and Chatham. It also reflects the bank’s difficulty in lending 
to suburban businesses and to out-of-area businesses with urban locations. In many cases, these firms are 
less interested in Shorebank’s social mission and relationship lending, and are more intent on securing 
loans with favorable pricing and on using sophisticated cash management services offered by larger banks. 
It is too early to tell how the tightening credit markets will affect Shorebank. Loan officers at the bank had 
not seen any changes in the demand for larger commercial loans, and, at the time of the interviews, the 
bank had not noticed any substantial deterioration of its portfolio performance. The bank has seen some 
increase in the number of small business applicants, with newer applicants appearing to be somewhat more 
creditworthy than existing customers. Such a trend would suggest that Shorebank stands to benefit from a 
credit shortage in the small business marketplace so long as it is adequately capitalized to take advantage of 
such an opportunity.
University National Bank
Based in St. Paul, Minnesota, University National Bank (UNB) was originally chartered as Summit National 
Bank of St. Paul in 1962. The bank changed its name in 1995 and made a conscious effort to focus on the 
financial needs of lower-income Twin Cities’ communities. It received federal certification as a CDFI in 
2001, the first insured depository in Minnesota to receive the designation. It offers a full range of banking 
and financial services to its customers, including consumer and business deposit services, residential and 
consumer loans, and commercial loan products. One of the bank’s larger and more innovative programs 
is Houses to Homes, which provides financing for acquiring and revitalizing blighted residential spaces. 
Seventy percent or more of UNB’s loans regularly target projects and borrowers in economically distressed 
neighborhoods.
Like many other urban markets, the Twin Cities have experienced considerable consolidation in the 
financial industry. Whereas locally chartered institutions held 60 percent of the area’s deposits in 2003, they 
held only 29 percent by 2007 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2008c). The increased market share of 
larger regional and national banks seems to have had negative ramifications for emerging small businesses, 
particularly those operating in low-income Minneapolis and St. Paul neighborhoods. Iric Nathanson, the 
Financial Resources Coordinator of the Metropolitan Consortium of Community Developers, notes that 
the larger banks have not been as consistently active in reaching out to such companies, and their emphasis 
on automated credit scoring has made it difficult for less established businesses to obtain the capital 
necessary to grow. Both he and Tene Wells, the President of Women Venture, a small business development 
organization based in St. Paul, report that the problem is most pronounced for start-up businesses, 
companies owned by recent immigrants, and firms with low levels of equity or collateral. Larger lenders 
appear noticeably less interested in making smaller loans to such companies and are unwilling to devote the 
time and resources to work closely with prospective borrowers that require more assistance with the lending 
and application process.
UNB has consistently taken a different tack, aggressively seeking out and assisting small businesses whose 
growth could help build and sustain the economic vitality of the local community. Whereas larger banks 
tend to rely on quantitative criteria when assessing loan applications, UNB emphasizes a relationship-
based approach. To develop and enhance their understanding of local needs and issues, loan officers are 
required to make 500 or more calls each year to nonbank customers and to participate as board members 
on local nonprofit organizations. The idea is that the lenders are able to develop more detailed knowledge 
of how local organizations work with individuals and companies that may well become bank borrowers. 
These relationships help UNB source potential loans and assist emerging companies to use capital most 
effectively. For example, loan officers make the effort to understand the individual businesses that come to 
them for financing, frequently referring potential loan applicants first to entities such as Women Venture for 
help in formulating their business plans and marketing strategies.
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These local partnerships, in conjunction with the lenders’ understanding of the applicants’ business model, 
allow for greater flexibility in underwriting. In addition to the underlying business fundamentals (cash flow, 
collateral, and the like), loan officers evaluate the character of the borrower, assessments that are influenced 
by the mutual relationships that the applicant and loan officers have with local partners. In effect, the loan 
officer can become the borrower’s advocate within the bank, helping to convince loan committee members 
of the likelihood of success even though the “hard” numbers may not suggest such an outcome. Because of 
this approach, UNB has made small business micro-loans of as little as $2,000. (The bank understandably 
does not engage in many of these transactions, as loans under $10,000 tend not to be profitable.) None of 
this is to suggest that UNB is making loans that would put its safety or soundness at risk, however; the bank 
uses guarantee programs to shore up its collateral position when necessary. For example, UNB received a 
$1 million loan from the city of St. Paul through its Neighborhood Lending Partnership, a program that 
guarantees loans made for companies operating in economically distressed communities to acquire and 
rehabilitate real estate and business equipment in these markets.
Although its community development orientation sets it apart from other regulated financial institutions in 
the market, UNB does not enjoy an uncontested niche. As a federally insured depository, it competes with 
more established banks, de novos, and larger credit unions for deposits. UNB is at a disadvantage because 
it has only one branch (in St. Paul), but it has invested heavily in technology to expand online banking 
throughout its service area. It has specifically targeted socially minded individuals, local businesses, faith-
based organizations, and other CDFIs, both within and outside the Twin Cities, for deposits in its Socially 
Responsible Deposit Fund. The deposits earn competitive interest rates and are earmarked for community 
development loans in economically challenged neighborhoods in Minneapolis and St. Paul.
UNB offers a range of small business loan products, including term loans, commercial real estate loans, 
working capital lines of credit, and business credit cards. It encounters relatively little competition for 
its very small transactions, as they are not very profitable for anyone. It faces much stiffer competition, 
particularly from larger national and regional banks, for larger commercial and industrial loans. UNB’s 
relatively small size ($117.6 million in total assets as of June 30, 2008) limits how much it can realistically 
lend to any single project. The larger banks can also often beat UNB on price, although UNB tends to have 
an edge when the deals require more complex underwriting and place a premium on local and interpersonal 
relationships. UNB largely focuses on lending to existing firms; only 15 percent of small business loans 
were to start-ups. The average interest rate on the bank’s small business loans was 6.4 percent, with a typical 
term of two to three years. 
The strongest competition on much of UNB’s small business activities comes from the region’s de novo 
banks. The extensive mergers and acquisitions during the past 15 years among the region’s financial 
institutions have created an opportunity for more relationship- and niche-based lenders. Nearly one quarter 
of the banks with local charters in 2007 had been established in 2000 or later.31 Although they do not share 
UNB’s social mission, these emerging banks differentiate themselves from more established banks by their 
customer and borrower interaction. In some cases, UNB will lend in partnership with these institutions, 
usually when the requested loan is too large for a single small bank to make comfortably. Yet in many cases, 
UNB has lost potential borrowers to the de novos as the banks sought to expand their portfolios as quickly 
as possible.
How serious and consistent the competition for small business loans will be remains to be seen. At this 
point, UNB officials are not particularly concerned. The larger, more established banks periodically attempt 
to capture a significant portion of the small business market in lower-income areas, but they rarely maintain 
a long-term commitment to that market. The de novos might be more serious competitors because of their 
focus on relationship lending, but they have yet to survive through an extended downturn in the business 
cycle. UNB believes that the types of loans that the de novos have made could cause some problems. 
According to Bank President David Reiling and holding company Vice President Nikki Foster, the de novos 
have not adequately priced their loans relative to their underlying risk. For example, they have loaned at 
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below-prime rates to companies in business for less than a year and with shaky collateral. Comparing the 
underwriting to that of subprime housing lenders, Reiling contends that the de novos will end up with a 
substantial proportion of bad loans on their books within the next year or so. To the extent that those banks 
have to devote more resources to cleaning up their portfolios, UNB should benefit. The CDFI worked to 
restructure and write off many of its problem loans during the past 18 months and therefore should have a 
cushion that will enable it to be more aggressive in the small business arena. Reiling also anticipates being 
in a position to hire away some of the experienced commercial lenders from those de novos that experience 
portfolio problems, particularly if those banks have not yet reached profitability and are forced to consolidate.
Table 3 summarizes the key themes from the above case studies. It focuses on central characteristics of both 
the competitive and collaborative relationships between CDFIs and mainstream financial institutions. The 
table also summarizes some of the important challenges to collaborative relationships and factors affecting a 
CDFI’s ability to compete in the future. 
Table 3: Characteristics of CDFI-Bank Relationships
ACCION 
Texas
Colorado 
Enterprise 
Fund 
Cooperative 
Business 
Assistance 
Corporation 
Santa Cruz 
Community 
Credit Union 
Shorebank
University 
Bank
Collaborative Relationship Characteristics
Recipient of Large Bank Capital √ √ √ √
Referrals to Mainstream Banks √ √ √
Gap Financing on Larger Projects √ √ √ √ √
Collaborative Challenges
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions √ √ √
Bank Business Referral Requirements √ √
Competitive Relationship Characteristics
Competes for Deposits √ √ √
De Novo Banks √ √
Competes for Large Commercial Loans √ √
Competes for Smaller Loans √
Competitive Limitations
Lack of Loan Capital √ √ √ √ √ √
Limited Technology Investment √ √
Lack of Physical Branch Presence √ √
Discussion
What emerges from the case studies is a continuum of credit. A subset of small businesses lacks the 
experience, financial structure, or credit history to obtain financing from conventional banks. These 
entities (or individuals, in the case of very small companies) frequently need a fair amount of assistance 
in developing a business plan, targeting their market, and improving their management and financial 
structures to become viable borrowers. Such work requires much more intensive, relationship-based 
underwriting and technical assistance than conventional lenders are willing to provide. De novo institutions 
focus on relationship-based lending and target companies that more established banks shun, but they too 
are generally unwilling to engage in significant lending to fledgling companies, particularly those needing 
comparatively small loans. CDFIs, particularly nonprofit loan funds, thus become the primary providers 
of credit for these businesses. The organizations’ explicit focus on community economic development 
and lending to underserved populations, coupled with their ability to attract funding from a wide range of 
public and philanthropic sources, demands they target such companies.
The Community Reinvestment Act requires that banks lend and invest throughout their service areas. The 
mandate has contributed to heightened competition for “bankable” borrowers in low-income communities. 
Not surprisingly, more established, bankable small businesses can often play off multiple lenders when 
looking for larger loans (those of $100,000 or more). Yet direct financing is only one manifestation of the 
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competition. Banks work diligently to attract small businesses as depositors. Not only do the deposits 
help increase the bank’s low-cost capital base, but they also offer the opportunity for current and future 
cross-selling opportunities― major sources of bank revenue. Banks have therefore worked closely with 
CDFI small business loan funds to build and sustain a base of customers. They frequently refer depositors 
who cannot qualify for bank financing to CDFIs that specialize in less sophisticated small businesses; 
the company can address its immediate financing needs while remaining a bank customer. Mainstream 
banks regularly provide these CDFIs with low-interest loan and investment capital, operating grants, and 
technical assistance in the form of board and loan committee members as well as training in lending and 
underwriting. Not only do the banks receive CRA loan and investment credit for their CDFI-related work, 
but they also frequently partner with the CDFIs in making direct loans to more stable small businesses in 
need of larger capital amounts. Underlying the bank-CDFI relationship is an assumption that the CDFI 
will refer stronger, more bankable borrowers to the bank in the future, often after those companies have 
built their credit history with the CDFI.
Such collaborative relationships do not come without costs to the CDFIs, however. ACCION’s Janie 
Barrera and others noted the bank partners’ increasing emphasis on ensuring that their grants and 
investments in CDFIs ultimately improve the banks’ bottom line. For example, banks increasingly require 
financial returns on their capital investments in the organizations and formal referral agreements from the 
CDFIs. In exchange for lending and operating capital, banks want to ensure that the CDFI sends them 
bankable CDFI “graduates” for small business lending services. In some cases, the banks’ capital comes with 
a requirement that a bank member is seated on the CDFI’s board of directors. These conditions could limit 
the CDFI’s ability to work with a variety of financial institutions and maximize funding opportunities. Yet, 
thus far, the benefits of the bank relationships appear to outweigh the costs.
There are notable differences in the relationships between banks and CDFI loan funds and those between 
banks and CDFI-insured depositories. Although the former tend to be much more collaborative in nature, 
the latter are generally more competitive. As regulated institutions, community development banks and 
credit unions inherently have less flexibility in their lending; they cannot take on as much risk as a loan 
fund might because of regulator concerns about financial soundness and stability. Thus, although they may 
engage in some lending to small businesses deemed too costly or risky by both established and de novo 
institutions, they must supplement those transactions with loans to more stable companies, many of which 
need (and can support) larger loans. This lending often places the CDFI depositories in direct competition 
with more conventional lenders looking to carve out their own niche in the particular local market 
(the typical de novo strategy), expand their existing activities, or satisfy both CRA and internal lending 
benchmarks.32
The competition affects not just lending, but also the institutions’ deposit bases. To attract both borrowers 
and depositors, the CDFI depositories in this study and others typically seek to exploit their emphasis on 
relationship-based lending and financial services, their flexibility in addressing customer needs, their in-
depth knowledge of the local market, their community development mission, and the technical assistance 
they are willing to provide. Unfortunately, many of those characteristics (except for the community 
development mission) also apply to non-CDFI community banks and credit unions. Although these 
institutions’ relationship-based lending generally focuses on larger loans to relatively established firms, 
de novos are often willing to target smaller, stable businesses in lower-income markets that need more 
moderately sized loans―in effect, some of the CDFIs’ actual or potential customers. One has to wonder 
whether the CDFI deposit bases are ultimately limited to particular subsets of low-income individuals and 
communities, as well as certain socially minded investors, many of whom field multiple requests for their 
social investments.
Thus far, the relatively small size of the CDFI depositories―even Shorebank pales in comparison to a typical 
regional bank―has limited their competitiveness in attracting capital and making larger loans. Larger banks 
frequently invest more heavily in technology, which enables them to offer sophisticated cash management 
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services and automated consumer loans in addition to basic checking and savings accounts. They tend 
to have more extensive branch networks, which gives them a broader range of potential depositors. By 
comparison, CDFI depositories typically have at most a handful of branches. Given that basic deposit 
accounts pay low interest rates, the larger banks often have a lower cost of funds, which enables them to 
offer more favorable pricing on their loans. The CDFI banks and credit unions often cannot compete 
effectively on price, and therefore must identify niches where their expertise and “high-touch” approach 
prove advantageous. The competitive pricing offered by conventional banks also usually does not apply to 
many of the smaller, fledgling companies the CDFIs are more likely to serve, given that such companies 
typically do not meet the banks’ underwriting criteria.
How the credit tightening associated with the weak economy will affect the CDFI-bank relationships 
remains to be seen. On one hand, stricter bank underwriting standards may well drive formerly bankable 
borrowers toward CDFIs as declining real estate values undermine the worth of collateral. On the other 
hand, the pressures of a weaker economy affect the CDFIs as well. Organizations throughout the industry, 
be they residential or commercial lenders, are experiencing more problems with their own portfolios as a 
result of falling real estate values, general market contractions, and the current economic recession. It is 
quite possible that CDFIs will have to tighten their own underwriting standards in response, which could 
limit their lending to some of their previous small business markets.
A potentially greater problem for the CDFIs is that of loan capital. To meet the potential increase in 
demand for financing, and to expand their bases of borrowers in general, the organizations must be able 
to build their loan pools. To continue offering affordable pricing and technical assistance to higher-risk 
borrowers, they need a fair amount of low-cost capital. Yet the sources of such capital are nowhere near as 
plentiful as they were in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Until recently, the federal CDFI Fund’s budget 
was less than half of what it was at the turn of the decade, and financial assistance awards to CDFIs have 
been capped at up to 75 percent below what was requested. Some of the foundations that had been most 
supportive of the CDFI industry―the Ford and MacArthur Foundations, for example―have cut back their 
grant-making and program-related investing to CDFIs. Similarly, banks have sharply curtailed the amount 
of equity-like investments they make in CDFIs, opting instead for term loans with rates that are closer to 
what the market bears. The continuing consolidation of the banking industry has also reduced the number 
of potential sources of CDFI capital.
This situation has been exacerbated by the current banking and credit crisis. Financial institutions have 
absorbed many large banks that were active sources of capital to CDFIs, such as Wachovia, Washington 
Mutual, and National City. It is unclear how these acquisitions will affect overall levels of bank funding to 
CDFIs, but history indicates that consolidated institutions fund CDFIs at levels below what the institutions 
provided separately. In addition, the current global financial crisis has caused capital markets to seize up, 
likely making access to existing and new sources of capital extremely challenging and more costly for CDFIs. 
As one response to the shortage of low-cost capital, CDFIs have attempted to become more self-sufficient, 
which makes them less reliant on operating grants and allows them to use outside support to build their 
loan funds. Community development banks and credit unions have always had to break even or generate a 
profit to satisfy their regulators, but most small business loan funds have been fortunate to cover 75 percent 
of their operating costs with earned revenues. For example, in FY 2006, the average micro-enterprise loan 
fund covered 47 percent of its operating costs with earned revenues.33 ACCION has automated as much 
of its lending as possible and has focused on loan volume as a way to compensate for the relatively small 
amount of income it can generate from an individual loan. In the process, it has effectively minimized 
the amount of “high-touch” technical assistance it provides borrowers. The Colorado Enterprise Fund has 
actively sought to make larger loans (in the $70,000 to $100,000 range), with the intent of using the greater 
interest and fee income from such deals to subsidize its less lucrative micro-lending. Yet such an approach 
threatens at some point to bring the CDFI into more direct competition with conventional banks, a 
showdown in which the banks have distinct advantages in pricing loans and offering accompanying 
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financial services. Both ACCION’s and CEF’s strategies also run the risk of shifting the CDFIs away from 
those fledgling small businesses that they were initially designed to serve--another example of the tension 
between the financial bottom line and social mission goals.
Our analysis is admittedly exploratory. The six organizations studied are neither representative of CDFI 
small business lenders nor typical of community development loan funds, banks, or credit unions. Our 
case studies also address only a few components of the organizations and their markets, and they do not 
delve into more complicated questions of institutional impact or borrower viability. On the basis of the 
commonalities in our findings and our experience with numerous other CDFIs, however, we contend 
that the general trends we have highlighted are fairly typical of the interactions and relationships between 
conventional and CDFI small business lenders. Operating from that premise, we offer the following 
suggestions for both future research and policymaking.
First, the field needs more in-depth, primarily quantitative research on the specific differences in the 
borrowers served by CDFI small business loan funds, CDFI depositories, de novo banks, and more 
established banks. At this point, we cannot distinguish, except in general terms, among the typical 
borrowers served by each type of institution, and how those characteristics differ across markets. We also do 
not know as much as we should about the differences in loan products offered to these borrowers. To what 
extent are community development and conventional banks competing for the same types of borrowers? To 
what extent are conventional lenders more competitive on pricing? Answering these and related questions 
requires a more complete set of data than is currently available industry wide for CDFIs, as well as currently 
proprietary information from conventional and de novo lenders. Realistically, such a study (or series of 
studies) is most feasible within a particular market with sufficient small business activity on the part of 
both CDFIs and conventional lenders. With the help of the bank regulators and the individual CDFIs, 
researchers could obtain the necessary transaction-level data, including information on borrower credit 
score, credit history, collateral, and other key underwriting information. Such an analysis would help us 
understand whether and to what extent CDFIs truly are serving otherwise unbankable individuals and 
could provide an important guide to policymakers.
Second, similar research needs to track the relative impact of CDFI small business lenders on their 
borrowers. Controlling for borrower size, loan amount, borrower/business track record, and the like, how 
well do CDFI-supported companies fare relative to those served by more-conventional lenders? What is 
the survival rate of CDFI-supported small businesses after five years? To what extent do the companies 
experience notable growth in their revenues and net worth? Do companies that receive substantial technical 
assistance from CDFIs fare better than similar companies that do not? In short, is there evidence that 
CDFIs help effect more positive social outcomes than a conventional lender? Again, such information 
would prove helpful in assessing the value of the CDFI small business approach.
Third, assuming that there is a distinct subset of small business borrowers that CDFIs serve, and that CDFI 
engagement with these entrepreneurs and companies results in tangible benefits to the companies and 
the local marketplace, additional low-cost capital must be made available to help the CDFIs expand their 
operations. Policymakers should understand that CDFI small business loan funds are unlikely to become 
self-sufficient if they continue to offer extensive technical assistance while targeting generally unbankable 
borrowers. If policymakers deem such activities important, they should be willing to subsidize both the 
CDFIs’ operations and their capital pools. One strategy would be to increase the amount of capital made 
available through entities such as the CDFI Fund and similar state programs. Another might be to designate 
certain pools of capital for such uses as part of federal, regional, or state economic development efforts.
23
Appendix A: Case Study Informants
Camden / CBAC
Mike Diemer, Executive Director CBAC
Tom Kelly, Senior Vice President of Small Business Banking and Consumer and Mortgage Lending Sun 
National Bank
Joseph Tredinnick, Regional Vice President, Commerce Bank
Gary Rago, Regional Director, New Jersey SBDC
Chicago / Shorebank
Vickie Battle, Senior Vice President, Director of Business Banking, Shorebank
Kaushik Shah, Vice President – Senior Loan Officer, Shorebank
Curt Roechley, Director of Hull House, sponsored by Uptown SBDC
Kelly Mizuer, former Business Finance Specialist, Women’s Business Development Center
Calvin Holmes, Executive Director, Chicago Community Loan Fund
Denver / Colorado Enterprise Fund
Ceyl Prinster, Executive Director of Colorado Enterprise Fund 
Brett Haigler, President of Guaranty Bank and Trust
Sharon King, Director of Boulder SBDC
William Stiewig and Shelly Marquez, Loan Officer and Vice President of  
Community Development at Wells Fargo
San Antonio / ACCION
Janie Barrera, President and CEO of ACCION Texas
Sue Malone, President of Strategies for Small Business, Superior Financial 
Daniel Delehanty, Vice President of Economic & Community Development, Capital One
Al Salgado, Regional Director San Antonio SBDC
Santa Cruz / SCCCU
Sheila Schat, Director of Community Outreach and Marketing, SCCCU 
Randy Johnson, Loan Officer, SCCCU
Theresa Thomae, Director of Santa Cruz SBDC
Karen Nuno, Vice President and Government Guaranteed Loan Manager, RaboBank
Carol Cook, Wendy Franscioni and Herb Aarons, Loan Officers and President of Cal Coastal
Twin Cities / University National Bank
David Reiling and Nikki Foster, CEO and AVP of Sunrise Community Banks
Iric Nathanson, Financial Resources Coordinator of The Metropolitan Consortium of  
Community Development 
Tene Wells, President, Women Venture
Rachel Peterson, Executive Vice President and Chief Lending Officer, Bridgewater Bank
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Appendix B: Interview Questions
Questions for CDFIs:
Lending Market
•	 How	does	your	institution	define	its	target	market?	
•	 Do	thresholds	for	borrowers	exist	(i.e.	age	of	business,	size	of	business,	experience	of	business	
owner, etc)?
•	 Have	changes	in	the	regional	banking	industry	affected	your	institution’s	lending	behavior?	If	so,	
how?
Loan Products
•	 What	small	business	loan	products	does	your	institution	offer?
•	 How	are	the	products	and	services	offered	by	your	institution	different	from	those	offered	by	
mainstream lenders in your target market? 
•	 Describe	the	underwriting	criteria	for	your	small	business	loan	products.
•	 What	target	market	needs	are	you	trying	to	address	/	addressing	with	the	current	product	offerings?
•	 Do	unmet	needs	remain	in	your	target	market?	If	so,	why?
•	 Have	you	developed	new	products	for	your	target	market(s)?	What	factors	drove	this	innovation?
Relationships With Mainstream Banks
•	 Have	the	markets	targeted	by	your	institution	begun	to	overlap	with	those	of	mainstream	banks?	
In what way? If so, why?
•	 Have	efforts	to	grow	to	scale	or	reach	some	level	of	self-sufficiency	caused	your	institution	to	be	in	
more direct competition with mainstream lenders for larger or higher-performing borrowers? 
•	 Does	your	institution	have	current	borrowers	that	could	be	served	by	mainstream	banks?	Do	you	
target such borrowers for certain loan products?
•	 In	what	ways	has	your	institution	collaborated	with	mainstream	banks?
•	 Has	your	institution	noticed	mainstream	lenders	being	more	active	in	your	target	market(s)?	How	
has your institution responded?
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Questions for Mainstream Banks:
Target Market
•	 What	is	your	bank’s	small	business	lending	strategy?
•	 Does	the	bank	have	a	specific	strategy	for	CRA	small	business	lending?	If	so,	how	does	it	differ	
from the bank’s overall small business lending strategy?
•	 Do	thresholds	for	borrowers	exist	(i.e.	age	of	business,	size	of	business,	experience	of	business	
owner, etc)?
•	 Have	changes	in	the	regional	banking	industry	caused	the	bank	to	reach	out	to	new	markets?	 
If so, how?
•	 Who	does	the	bank	see	as	its	primary	competition	in	this	market?
•	 Who	serves	businesses	the	bank	does	not	serve?
Lending Products
•	 What	small	business	loan	products	does	the	bank	offer?	
•	 Are	there	specific	products	tailored	to	reach	more	difficult	to	serve	markets?
•	 What	is	the	target	market	for	these	product	offerings?
•	 How	does	the	bank	market	these	products?
•	 Describe	the	underwriting	criteria	for	the	bank’s	small	business	loan	products.
•	 Has	the	bank	developed	new	products	for	difficult	to	serve	markets?	What	factors	drove	this	
innovation?
Relationships with CDFIs
•	 Has	the	bank	noticed	any	overlap	in	its	markets	and	those	targeted	by	local	CDFIs?	In	what	way?	
When did the overlap begin? What drove it?
•	 In	what	ways	does	the	bank	collaborate	with	CDFIs?
•	 Could	the	bank	serve	the	borrowers	targeted	by	local	CDFIs?	If	yes,	why	isn’t	the	bank	taking	the	
CDFIs’ business? If no, why not?
•	 What	does	the	bank	see	as	the	role	of	CDFIs?
•	 In	what	ways,	if	any,	has	the	bank’s	small	business	lending	behavior	been	influenced	by	CDFI	
lending?
•	 Does	the	bank	actively	seek	business	owners	who	utilize	CDFI	products?
•	 Do	CDFI	products	at	all	influence	bank	product	development?
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Questions for Key Informants:
•	 What	do	you	see	as	the	relationship	between	CDFIs	and	mainstream	banks	in	the	regional	lending	
markets? 
•	 How	do	the	products	and	services	offered	by	CDFIs	differ	from	those	offered	by	mainstream	
lenders? 
•	 How	responsive	are	CDFIs	and	mainstream	banks	to	the	needs	of	business	owners	in	underserved	
markets?
•	 In	what	ways	has	CDFI	small	business	lending	influenced	lending	by	mainstream	financial	
institutions? In what ways have banks’ activities changed the approach of CDFIs?
•	 Have	certain	CDFI	products	or	services	have	bigger	impacts	than	others?	
•	 Have	the	markets	targeted	by	CDFI	and	mainstream	institutions	begun	to	converge?	If	yes,	what	
factors have been driving these changes?
•	 Have	efforts	of	individual	CDFIs	and	the	CDFI	industry	to	grow	to	scale	changed	the	relationship	
between CDFIs and mainstream financial institutions
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